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## Consultation on the revision of the NIS Directive

Fields marked with \* are mandatory.

#### Introduction

As our daily lives and economies become increasingly dependent on digital technologies and internet-based services and products, we become more vulnerable and exposed to cyber-attacks. We are witnessing that the threat landscape is constantly evolving and the attack surface constantly expanding, putting network and information systems at greater risk than ever before. The COVID-19 crisis and the resulting growth in demand for internet-based solutions has emphasised even more the need for a state of the art response and preparedness for a potential future crisis. Maintaining a high level of cybersecurity across the European Union has become essential to keep the economy running and to ensure prosperity.

<u>Directive (EU) 2016/1148</u> concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union ("NIS Directive" or "the Directive") is the first horizontal internal market instrument aimed at improving the resilience of the EU against cybersecurity risks. Based on Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the NIS Directive provides legal measures to boost the overall level of cybersecurity in the EU by ensuring:

- a high level of preparedness of Member States by requiring them to designate one or more national Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) responsible for risk and incident handling and a competent national NIS authority;
- cooperation among all the Member States by establishing the Cooperation Group to support and facilitate strategic cooperation and the exchange of information among Member States, and the CSIRTs network, which promotes swift and effective operational cooperation between national CSIRTs;
- a culture of security across sectors which are vital for our economy and society and moreover rely heavily on ICTs, such as energy, transport, banking, financial market infrastructures, drinking water, healthcare and digital infrastructure. Public and private entities identified by the Member States as operators of essential services in these sectors are required to undertake a risk assessment and put it place appropriate and proportionate security measures as well as to notify serious incidents to the relevant authorities. Also providers of key digital services such as search engines, cloud computing services and online marketplaces have to comply with the security and notification requirements under the Directive.

Article 23 of the NIS Directive requires the European Commission to review the functioning of this Directive periodically. As part of its key policy objective to make "Europe fit for the digital age" as well as in line with the objectives of the Security Union, the Commission announced in its Work Programme 2020 that it would

conduct the review by the end of 2020. This would advance the deadline foreseen under Article 23(2) of the Directive, according to which the Commission shall review the Directive for the first time and report to the European Parliament and the Council by 9 May 2021.

As part of this process, this consultation seeks your views on the topic of cybersecurity as well as on the different elements of the NIS Directive, which are all subject to the review. The results of this consultation will be used for the evaluation and impact assessment of the NIS Directive.

This consultation is open to everybody: citizens, public and private organisations, trade associations and academics. The questionnaire is divided in three sections:

- Section 1 contains general questions on the NIS Directive that are accessible to all categories of stakeholders.
- Section 2 contains technical questions on the functioning of the NIS Directive. This section is mainly targeted at individuals, organisations or authorities that are familiar with the NIS Directive and cybersecurity policies.
- Section 3 aims to gather views on approaches to cybersecurity in the European context currently not addressed by the NIS Directive. This section is mainly targeted at individuals, organisations or authorities that are familiar with the NIS Directive and cybersecurity policies.

Written feedback provided in other document formats can be uploaded through the button made available at the end of the questionnaire.

The survey will remain open until 02 October 2020 - 23h00.

### About you

*Language of my contribution	
Bulgarian	
Croatian	
Czech	
Danish	
Dutch	

- EnglishEstonianFinnishFrench
- Gaelic
- German
- Greek

	Hungarian
	Italian
0	Latvian
	Lithuanian
	Maltese
	Polish
	Portuguese
	Romanian
	Slovak
	Slovenian
0	Spanish
0	Swedish
lam	giving my contribution as
0	Academic/research institution
•	Business association
0	Company/business organisation
0	Consumer organisation
0	EU citizen
0	Environmental organisation
0	Non-EU citizen
0	Non-governmental organisation (NGO)
0	Public authority
0	Trade union
0	Other
First	name
С	amille
Surn	ame
С	ornier
Ema	il (this won't be published)
	amille.dornier@eurosmart.com

## \*Organisation name

255 character(s) maximum

Eurosmart		

## \*Organisation size

- Micro (1 to 9 employees)
- Small (10 to 49 employees)
- Medium (50 to 249 employees)
- Large (250 or more)

### Transparency register number

255 character(s) maximum

Check if your organisation is on the transparency register. It's a voluntary database for organisations seeking to influence EU decisionmaking.

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or that of your organisation.	Libyo	Saint Martin
Dominica	Liechtenstein	Saint Pierre
		and Miquelon
Dominican	Lithuania	Saint Vincent
Republic		and the
		Grenadines
Ecuador	Luxembourg	Samoa
Egypt	Macau	San Marino
El Salvador	Madagascar	São Tomé and
	-	Príncipe
Equatorial	Malawi	Saudi Arabia
Guinea		
Eritrea	Malaysia	Senegal
Estonia	Maldives	Serbia
Eswatini	Mali	Seychelles
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Armenia	Falkland Islands	<ul><li>Marshall</li><li>Islands</li></ul>	Singapore
Aruba	Faroe Islands	Martinique	Sint Maarten
Australia	Fiji	Mauritania	Slovakia
Austria	Finland	Mauritius	Slovenia
Azerbaijan	France	Mayotte	Solomon
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Bahamas	French Guiana	Mexico	Somalia
Bahrain	French	Micronesia	South Africa
	Polynesia		
Bangladesh	French	Moldova	South Georgia
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Barbados	Gabon	Monaco	South Korea
Belarus	Georgia	Mongolia	South Sudan
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Belize	Ghana	Montserrat	Sri Lanka
Benin	Gibraltar	Morocco	Sudan
Bermuda	Greece	Mozambique	Suriname
Bhutan	Greenland	Myanmar	Svalbard and
		/Burma	Jan Mayen
Bolivia	Grenada	Namibia	Sweden
Bonaire Saint	Guadeloupe	Nauru	Switzerland
Eustatius and			
Saba			
Bosnia and	Guam	Nepal	Syria
Herzegovina			
Botswana	Guatemala	Netherlands	Taiwan
Bouvet Island	Guernsey	New Caledonia	Tajikistan
Brazil	Guinea	New Zealand	Tanzania
British Indian	Guinea-Bissau	Nicaragua	Thailand
Ocean Territory			
British Virgin	Guyana	Niger	The Gambia
Islands			

	Brunei		Haiti		Nigeria		Timor-Leste
	Bulgaria	0	Heard Island and McDonald Islands	0	Niue	©	Togo
0	Burkina Faso	0	Honduras	0	Norfolk Island	0	Tokelau
0	Burundi	0	Hong Kong	0	Northern	0	Tonga
	Darana.		riong riong		Mariana Islands		· o.i.ga
0	Cambodia	0	Hungary	0	North Korea	0	Trinidad and Tobago
	Cameroon		Iceland		North		Tunisia
					Macedonia		
	Canada		India		Norway		Turkey
0	Cape Verde		Indonesia		Oman		Turkmenistan
	Cayman Islands		Iran		Pakistan		Turks and
							Caicos Islands
	Central African		Iraq		Palau		Tuvalu
	Republic						
	Chad	0	Ireland	0	Palestine	0	Uganda
	Chile		Isle of Man		Panama		Ukraine
	China	0	Israel	0	Papua New	0	United Arab
					Guinea		Emirates
	Christmas	0	Italy	0	Paraguay	0	United
	Island						Kingdom
0	Clipperton	0	Jamaica	0	Peru	0	United States
	Cocos (Keeling)	0	Japan	0	Philippines	0	United States
	Islands						Minor Outlying
			_				Islands
	Colombia		Jersey		Pitcairn Islands	0	Uruguay
	Comoros		Jordan		Poland	0	US Virgin
	_				_		Islands
	Congo		Kazakhstan		Portugal		Uzbekistan
0	Cook Islands		Kenya		Puerto Rico		Vanuatu
	Costa Rica		Kiribati		Qatar		Vatican City
0	Côte d'Ivoire	0	Kosovo	0	Réunion	0	Venezuela
	Croatia		Kuwait		Romania		Vietnam

Cuba	Kyrgyzstan	Russia	Wallis and					
			Futuna					
Curação	Laos	Rwanda	Western					
			Sahara					
Cyprus	Latvia	Saint	Yemen					
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Republic of the		Nevis						
Congo								
Denmark	Liberia	Saint Lucia						
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	responses to this public consultation	on. You can choose whether you	would like your details to be made					
public or to remain anonymous.  Anonymous								
•	Only your type of respondent, country of origin and contribution will be							
	her personal details (	,						
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transparency register number) will not be published.								

Public

Your personal details (name, organisation name and size, transparency register number, country of origin) will be published with your contribution.

- ☑ I agree with the personal data protection provisions
- \*Can you specify further your capacity in which you are replying to the questionnaire on the review of the NIS Directive?
  - Citizen
  - Centralised national competent authority in charge of supervision
  - Sectoral national competent authority in charge of supervision
  - National CSIRT
  - Other national competent authority
  - EU body
  - Operator of essential services currently covered by the NIS Directive

Economic operator currently not covered by the NIS Directive
Trade association representing entities currently covered by the NIS Directive
Trade association representing entities currently not covered by the NIS
Directive
Trade association representing both entities currently covered and entities
not covered by the NIS Directive
Academia
Cybersecurity professional
Consumer organisation
Other
Please specify the sector you are responsible for:
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Digital Security Industry
*Before starting this survey, are you aware of the <u>objectives and principles</u> of the EU Directive on security of network and information systems (the NIS Directive)?  Output  Directive and principles of the EU Directive on security of network and information systems (the NIS Directive)?
Slightly aware
Aware     Aware
Strongly aware
Don't know / no opinion
Has your organisation been impacted by the adoption of the NIS Directive (for example by having to adopt certain measures stemming directly from the Directive or from national laws transposing the Directive, or by participating in the various cooperation fora established by the Directive)?    Yes
No
Don't know / no opinion
Section 1: General questions on the NIS Directive
Sub-section 1.a. – Relevance of the NIS Directive
Can Could have hold and of the photon

Digital service provider currently covered by the NIS Directive

The NIS Directive envisages to (1) increase the capabilities of Member States when it comes to mitigating cybersecurity risks and handling incidents, (2) improve the level of cooperation amongst Member States in

the field of cybersecurity and the protection of essential services, and (3) promote a culture of cybersecurity across all sectors vital for our economy and society.

#### Q1: To what extent are these objectives still relevant?

	Not relevant at all	Not relevant	Relevant	Very relevant	Don't know / no opinion
Increase the capabilities of Member States	0	0	0	•	0
Improve the level of cooperation amongst Member States	0	0	0	•	0
Promote a culture of security across all sectors vital for our economy and society	0	0	•	•	0

## Sub-section 1.b. - Cyber-threat landscape

Q1: Since the entry into force of the NIS Directive in 2016, how has in your opinion the cyber threat landscape evolved?

- Cyber threat level has decreased significantly
- Cyber threat level has decreased
- Cyber threat level is the same
- Cyber threat level has increased
- Cyber threat level has increased significantly
- Don't know / no opinion

Q2: How do you evaluate the level of preparedness of small and medium-sized companies in the EU against current cyber threats (on a scale from 1 to 5 with 5 indicating that companies score highly on cyber resilience)?

- 0 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- <sup>©</sup> 5
- Don't know / no opinion

Sub-section 1.c. - Technological advances and new trends

Technological advances and new trends provide great opportunities to the economy and society as a whole. The growing importance of edge computing (which is a new model of technology deployment that

brings data processing and storage closer to the location where it is needed, to improve response times and save bandwidth), as well as the high reliance on digital technologies especially during the COVID-19 crisis increases at the same time the potential attack surface for malicious actors. All this changes the paradigm of security resulting in new challenges for companies to adapt their approaches to ensuring the cybersecurity of their services.

## Q1: In which way should such recent technological advances and trends be considered in the development of EU cybersecurity policy?

1000 character(s) maximum

EU cybersecurity policy should aim to increase the cyber-resilience of the entire IT network, including IoT devices, personal IT devices (smartphones, laptops etc.) and telecommunication networks. Cybersecurity-by-design for all products should be the key principle driving EU cybersecurity policy. However, different levels of cybersecurity should apply for different products, based on a risk management policy.

#### Sub-section 1.d. – Added-value of EU cybersecurity rules

The NIS Directive is based on the idea that common cybersecurity rules at EU level are more effective than national policies alone and thus contribute to a higher level of cyber resilience at Union level.

#### Q1: To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know / no opinion
Cyber risks can propagate across borders at high speed, which is why cybersecurity rules should be aligned at Union level	0	0	0	•	0
The mandatory sharing of cyber risk related information between national authorities across Member States would contribute to a higher level of joint situational awareness when it comes to cyber risks	•	•	0	•	•
All entities of a certain size providing essential services to our society should be subject to similar EU-wide cybersecurity requirements	0	0	0	•	0

## Sub-section 1.e. - Sectoral scope

Under the current NIS Directive, certain public and private entities are required to take appropriate security measures and notify serious incidents to the relevant national authorities. Entities subject to these requirements include so-called operators of essential services (OES) and digital service providers (DSP).

Operators of essential services are entities operating in seven sectors and subsectors: energy (electricity, oil and gas), transport (air, rail, water and road), banking, financial market infrastructures, health sector,

drinking water supply and distribution, and digital infrastructure (IXPs, DNS providers and TLD registries). Digital service providers are either cloud service providers, online search engines or online marketplaces.

# Q1: Should the following sectors or services be included in the scope of the Directive due to their exposure to cyber threats and their importance for the economy and the society as a whole?

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know / no opinion
Public administration	0	0	0	•	0
Food supply	0	0	0	•	0
Manufacturing	0	0	0	•	0
Chemicals	0	0	0	•	0
Waste water	0	0	0	•	0
Social networks	0	0	•	0	0
Data centres	0	0	0	•	0

Q2: Should undertakings providing public communications networks or publically available electronic communications services currently covered by the security and notification requirements of the EU telecom framework be included in the scope of the NIS Directive?

0	Vac
	YHS

<sup>⊚</sup> No

Don't know / no opinion

## If yes, please elaborate your answer:

1000 character(s) maximum

Telecom operators should be included in Annex II. Due to the deeper interaction of communication networks, mobile operators have a strong impact on the infrastructure they use and deploy. In a risk-based approach, it is more and more difficult to differentiate the service from the network.

In the light of its critical importance for Europe's sovereignty and industry, a focus should be given to the security of 5G and mobile network. The security of 5G and mobile network should consider their specificities, such as the identification of user on the network (IMSI in 4G and SUPI in 5G). Compromising the privacy of user identification on the network (IMSI or SUPI) may be a first step to compromising access to restricted resources and ultimately compromising information, as it may allow impersonation attempts. Thus, IMSI or SUPI should be encrypted before being disclosed. Certification pursuant to the Common Criteria at level EAL4+ at least covering identification should be required.

Q3: Do you consider that also other sectors, subsectors and/or types of digital services need to be included in the scope of the Directive due to their exposure to cyber threats and their importance for the economy and the society as a whole?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know / no opinion

#### If yes, please specify which sectors, subsectors and/or digital services:

1000 character(s) maximum

The list of essential services should include electronic public services (eGovernment) which are of utmost importance for citizens and businesses, especially during pandemic times. Disruption of electronic public services could result in businesses not being able to interact with the administration for registration or tax issues, citizens not getting their welfare benefits etc.

The security of network and information should also be considered in the light of protection of information, technology and knowledge essential to Europe's sovereignty and wealth against industrial espionage. Therefore, the definition of OES should be expanded to include all industries, Research and Technology Organisations (RTOs) and companies essential to Europe's sovereignty (AI, digital etc.) and wealth (exporting industry).

In addition, OTT services should be considered DSPs in the meaning of the NIS Directive, given their increasing importance in today's society.

## Sub-section 1.f. - Regulatory treatment of OES and DSPs by the NIS Directive

As regards the imposition of security and notification requirements, the NIS Directive distinguishes between two main categories of economic entities: operators of essential services (OES) and digital service providers (DSP). While in the case of OES, Member States are allowed to impose stricter security and notification requirements than those enshrined in the Directive, they are prohibited to do so for DSPs. Moreover, competent authorities can only supervise DSPs "ex-post" (when an authority is provided with evidence that a company does not fulfil its obligations) and not "ex-ante" as in the case of OES. These are elements of the so-called "light-touch" regulatory approach applied towards DSPs, which was motivated by the lower degree of risk posed to the security of the digital services and the cross-border nature of their services.

Q1: Do you agree that the "light-touch" regulatory approach applied towards DSPs is justified and therefore should be maintained?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know / no opinion

## Please elaborate your answer:

1000 character(s) maximum

OES and DSP should be put on an equal footing in the revised version of the NIS Directive. Such an approach would be justified by the critical importance of DSP in today's society. Thus, DSP should be identified by national authorities. They should also be subject to clear and harmonised security requirements, for instance requirement on strong authentication (to provide a level of assurance substantial or high pursuant to eIDAS).

#### Sub-section 1.g. - Information sharing

Under the NIS Directive, Member States must require operators of essential services (OES) and digital service providers (DSP) to report serious incidents. According to the Directive, incidents are events having an actual adverse effect on the security of network and information systems. As a result, reportable incidents constitute only a fraction of the relevant cybersecurity information gathered by OES and DSPs in their daily operations.

Q1: Should entities under the scope of the NIS Directive be required to provide additional information to the authorities beyond incidents as currently defined by the NIS Directive?

- Yes
- O No
- Don't know / no opinion

If yes, please specify which types of information they should make available and to whom:

1000 character(s) maximum

A link must be established between the obligation of incident notification, pursuant to the NIS directive, and the obligation of vulnerability disclosure for certified products (Cybersecurity Act). The manufacturer or provider of certified ICT products, services or processes must inform the national cybersecurity certification authority (NCCA) about the disclosure of vulnerabilities. Both incident notification and vulnerability disclosure are necessary and complementary to ensure a sustainable resistance to potential attacks over time and hence to maintain the "State of the Art".

## Section 2: Functioning of the NIS Directive

### Sub-section 2.a. - National strategies

The NIS Directive requires Member States to adopt national strategies on the security of network and information systems defining strategic objectives and policy measures to achieve and maintain a high level of cybersecurity and covering at least the sectors referred to in Annex II and the services referred to in Annex III of the Directive.

Q1: In your opinion, how relevant are common objectives set on EU level for the adoption of national strategies on the security of network and information systems in order to achieve a high level of cybersecurity?

Don't know / no opinion
Q2: Taking into account the evolving cybersecurity landscape, should national strategies take into account any additional elements so far not listed in the Directive?
Yes
© No
Don't know / no opinion
If yes, please specify which elements:
500 character(s) maximum
National strategies should take into account the development of AI (which is both a cybersecurity enabler and a target), as well as the exponential increase of IoT devices on the market.
Sub-section 2.b. – National competent authorities and bodies
The Directive requires Member States to designate one or more national competent authorities on the security of network and information systems to monitor the application of the Directive on a national level. In addition, Member States are required to appoint a single point of contact to ensure cross-border cooperation with the relevant authorities in other Member States and with the Cooperation Group and the CSIRT network as well as one or more computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs) responsible for risk and incident handling for the sectors and services covered by Annex II and III of the Directive.
Q1: In your opinion what is the impact of the NIS Directive on national authorities dealing with the security of network and information systems in the Member States?

No

impact

Low

impact

Medium

impact

0

0

0

High

impact

0

Not relevant at all

Not relevant

Very relevant

Level of funding

Level of staffing

Level of expertise

States

Cooperation of authorities across Member

Cooperation between national competent

authorities within Member States

Relevant

Don't

know / no

opinion

Q2: In your opinion, what is the impact of the NIS Directive on national Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) in the Member States?

	No impact	Low	Medium impact	High impact	Don't know / no opinion
Level of funding	0	0	0	0	•
Level of staffing	0	0	0	0	•
Level of operational capabilities	0	0	0	0	•
Level of expertise	0	0	0	0	•
Cooperation with OES and DSP	0	0	0	0	•
Cooperation with relevant national authorities (such as sectoral authorities)	0	0	0	0	•

Q3: How do you evaluate the quality of services provided by the national Computer
Security Incident Response Teams to OES (on a scale from 1 to 5 with 5 indicating
a very high level of quality)?

- 1
- 0 2
- 3
- 4
- <sup>©</sup> 5
- Don't know / no opinion

Q4: How do you evaluate the quality of services provided by the national Computer Security Incident Response Teams to DSPs (on a scale from 1 to 5 with 5 indicating a very high level of quality)?

- 0
- <sup>©</sup> 2
- <sup>©</sup> 3
- 4
- <sup>©</sup> 5
- Don't know / no opinion

Q5: Under the NIS Directive, competent authorities or the CSIRTs shall inform the other affected Member State(s) if an incident has a significant impact on the continuity of essential services in that Member State. How do you evaluate the

level of incident-related information sharing between Member States (on a scale
from 1 to 5 with 5 indicating a very high degree of satisfaction with the information
shared)?

1

<sup>©</sup> 2

3

4

<sup>©</sup> 5

Don't know / no opinion

Q6: If you are an OES/DSP: Has your organisation received technical support from the national CSIRTs in case of an incident?

Yes

O No

Don't know / no opinion

Q7: Should the CSIRTs be assigned additional tasks so far not listed in the NIS Directive?

Yes

No

Don't know / no opinion

Q8: How do you evaluate the functioning of the single points of contact (SPOCs) since their establishment by the NIS Directive as regards the performance of the following tasks (on a scale from 1 to 5 with 5 indicating a very high level of performance)?

	1	2	3	4	5	Don't know / no opinion
Cross-border cooperation with the relevant authorities in other Member States	0	0	0	•	0	0
Cooperation with the Cooperation Group	0	0	0	•	0	0
Cooperation with the CSIRTs network	0	0	0	•	0	0

Q9: Should the single points of contact be assigned additional tasks so far not listed in the NIS Directive?

types of entities could become subject to security required to identify the concrete operators for whice Directive.	ch these oblig	gations apply	by using	criteria set c	out in the
Q1: To what extent do you agree with t concept of identification of operators of		•	_		
NIS Directive and its implementation by			(OLO) II	moducca	by the
	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know / no opinion
The current approach ensures that all relevant operators are identified across the Union.	•	•	0	0	0
OES are aware of their obligations under the NIS Directive.	0	0	•	0	0
Competent authorities actively engage with OES.	0	0	•	0	0
The cross-border consultation procedure in its current form is an effective element of the					
					17

Q10: How do you evaluate the level of consultation and cooperation between

competent authorities and SPOCs on the one hand, and relevant national law

Sub-section 2.c. - Identification of operators of essential services and sectoral

Operators of essential services are organisations that are important for the functioning of the economy and society as a whole. While the NIS Directive provides a list of sectors and subsectors, in which particular

(on a scale from 1 to 5 with 5 indicating a very high level of cooperation)?

enforcement authorities and national data protection authorities on the other hand

Yes

Don't know / no opinion

Don't know / no opinion

<sup>◎</sup> No

1

© 2

<sup>©</sup> 3

4

<sup>©</sup> 5

scope

identification process to deal with cross- border dependencies.	0	•	0	0	0
The identification process has contributed to the creation of a level playing field for companies from the same sector across the Member States.	•	•	0	0	•

#### Please elaborate your answer:

1000 character(s) maximum

Last October, the European Commission acknowledged that there was a fragmentation issue in the identification process of OES. Identification methods greatly vary from one Member State to another. This leads to competition distortion as companies of the same nature might be imposed different requirements depending on the Member State where they operate. Likewise, a same company might be identified as OES in one Member State but not in another one, hence complying with different rules which creates additional burden. Therefore, it seems necessary to create convergence between the identification methods.

Q2: Given the growing dependence on ICT systems and the internet in all sectors of the economy, to what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding the scope of the NIS Directive when it comes to operators of essential services?

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know / no opinion
Definitions of the types of entities listed in Annex II are sufficiently clear.	0	•	0	0	0
More sectors and sub-sectors should be covered by the Directive.	0	0	0	•	0
Identification thresholds used by Member States should be lower (i.e. more companies should be covered).	0	0	•	0	0

### Please elaborate your answers:

1000 character(s) maximum

The diverging interpretations of Annex II of the Directive across the EU -with significant disparities in the level of granularity which is applied- implies that clearer definitions of the sectors are needed.

More companies should be covered by the security requirements as companies of small or medium size might still be actors providing an essential service.

Q3: If you agree with the statement above that more sectors and sub-sectors should be covered by the Directive, which other sectors should be covered by the scope of the NIS Directive and why?

1000 character(s) maximum

The list of essential services should include: (1) electronic public services (eGovernment), (2) telecommunication operators and (3) industries which are essential to Europe's sovereignty and wealth (see sub-section 1.e for more details).

In addition, the security requirements laid down in the NIS Directive should apply to suppliers. Cyber-attacks on suppliers can jeopardise the smooth functioning of OES or the secrecy of its key data, as demonstrated by the Airbus case in 2019. It is essential to ensure security throughout the entire supply chain of OES.

## Q4: How has the level of risk of cyber incidents in the different sectors and subsectors covered by the NIS Directive evolved since the Directive entered into force in 2016?

	Very significant decrease in risk	Significant decrease in risk	No increase or decrease in risk	Significant increase in risk	Very significant increase in risk	Don't know / no opinion
Electricity	0	0	0	•	0	0
Oil	0	0	0	•	0	0
Gas	0	0	0	•	0	0
Air transport	0	0	0	•	0	0
Rail transport	0	0	0	•	0	0
Water transport	0	0	0	•	0	0
Road transport	0	0	0	•	0	0
Banking	0	0	0	•	0	0
Financial market infrastructures	0	0	0	•	0	0
Health sector	0	0	0	0	0	0
Drinking water supply and distribution	0	0	0	•	0	0
Digital infrastructure (IXPs, DNS providers, TLD registries)	0	0	0	0	•	0

Q5: How do you evaluate the level of cybersecurity resilience when it comes to the different sectors and subsectors covered by the NIS Directive?

	Very	Low	Medium	High	Very high	Don't know / no opinion
Electricity	0	0	•	0	0	0
Oil	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gas	0	0	0	0	0	0
Air transport	0	0	0	•	0	0
Rail transport	0	0	0	•	0	0
Water transport	0	0	0	0	0	•
Road transport	0	0	0	•	0	0
Banking	0	0	0	•	0	0
Financial market infrastructures	0	0	0	•	0	0
Health sector	0	•	0	0	0	0
Drinking water supply and distribution	0	0	0	0	0	•
Digital infrastructure (IXPs, DNS providers, TLD registries)	0	0	0	•	0	0

Q6: How do you evaluate the level of cyber resilience and the risk-management practices applied by those small and medium-sized companies that are not covered by the NIS Directive (on a scale from 1 to 5 with 5 indicating that companies score highly on cyber resilience)?

	1	2	3	4	5	Don't know / no opinion
Small companies	•	0	0	0	0	•
Medium-sized companies	0	•	0	0	0	0

## Please elaborate your answers for both small and medium-sized companies:

	Your elaboration:
Small companies	Small companies often do not have the necessary skills and financial resources to implement the required cybersecurity tools. This leaves them highly vulnerable to cyber-attacks, including cyber-espionage and theft of trade secrets (see EC Report "The scale and impact of industrial espionage and theft of trade secrets through cyber", December 2018). Therefore, the future Digital Innovation Hubs are crucial for these small companies to get access to cybersecurity knowledge and equipment.
Medium-sized companies	The level of cyber-resilience and the risk management practices could also be increased in medium-sized companies.

Q7: Do you think that the level of resilience and the risk-management practices applied by companies differ from sector to sector for small and medium-sized companies?

0	V	_	_
$\circ$	Υ	e	S

<sup>◎</sup> No

Don't know / no opinion

#### If yes, please elaborate:

1000 character(s) maximum

There is more cyber-awareness among those SMEs operating in the field of new technologies.

### Sub-section 2.d. - Digital service providers and scope

Digital service providers (cloud service providers, online search engines and online marketplaces) shall also put in place security measures and report substantial incidents. For this type of entities, the Directive envisages a "light-touch" regulatory approach, which means inter alia that competent authorities can only supervise DSPs "ex-post" (when an authority is provided with evidence that a company does not fulfil its obligations). Member States are not allowed to impose any further security or reporting requirements than those set out in the Directive ("maximum harmonisation"). Jurisdiction is based on the criterion of main establishment in the EU.

## Q1: To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding the way in which the NIS Directive regulates digital service providers (DSPs)?

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know / no opinion
Annex III of the NIS Directive covers all relevant types of digital services.	•	0	0	0	0
Definitions of the types of digital services listed in Annex III are sufficiently clear.	0	•	0	0	0
DSPs are aware of their obligations under the NIS Directive.	0	•	0	0	0
Competent authorities have a good overview of the DSPs falling under their jurisdiction.	0	•	0	0	0
Competent authorities actively engage with DSPs under their jurisdiction.	0	•	0	0	0
Security requirements for DSPs are sufficiently harmonised at EU level.	•	0	0	0	0

Incident notification requirements for DSPs are sufficiently harmonised at EU level.	0	0	0	0	•
Reporting thresholds provided by the Implementing Regulation laying down requirements for Digital Service Providers under the NIS Directive are appropriate.	•	•	0	•	•

Q2: If you disagree with the statement above that Annex III of the NIS Directive covers all relevant types of digital services, which other types of providers of digital services should fall under the scope of the NIS Directive and why?

1000 character(s) maximum

- 1) The current definition of marketplaces does not cover P2P marketplaces and should be revised to cover all types of marketplaces.
- 2) OTT services should also be considered DSPs in the meaning of the NIS Directive, given their increasing importance in today's society.
- 3) DSPs rely on physical infrastructures (server, datacentre etc.). The security of their network and information also relies on the security of these physical anchors, which depends on external factors such as their location, their security and the law ruling them. To ensure the security of their network and information, all the physical anchors of DSP should be protected against any external actions that cannot be assessed, controlled mitigated, nor countered by the Member States. Therefore, digital service providers should use physical infrastructure exclusively located in Europe.

Q3: To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding the socalled "light-touch approach" of the NIS Directive towards digital service providers (DSPs)?

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know / no opinion
The more harmonised regulatory approach applied towards DSPs as compared to OES is justified by the cross-border nature of their services.	0	0	0	•	•
Subjecting DSPs to the jurisdiction of the Member State where they have their main establishment in the EU minimises the compliance burden for those companies.	0	•	•	•	•
The limitation related to the supervisory power of the national authorities, notably to take action only when provided with evidence (ex-post supervision), in the case of the DSPs is justified by the nature of their	•	©	0	©	©

services and the degree of cyber risk they face.					
The exclusion of micro- and small enterprises is reasonable considering the limited impact of their services on the economy and society as a whole.	0	•	0	•	•

## Please elaborate your answers:

10	000 character(s) maximum

## Q4: How do you evaluate the level of preparedness of digital service providers covered by the NIS Directive when it comes to cybersecurity related risks?

	Very low	Low	Medium	High	Very high	Don't know / no opinion
Online marketplaces	0	0	•	0	0	•
Online search engines	0	0	•	0	0	•
Cloud computing services	0	•	0	0	0	•

Q5: In the previous question, you have been asked about the level of preparedness of different types of digital service providers. Please explain your assessment of the level of preparedness:

	Your explanation:
Online marketplaces	
Online search engines	
Cloud computing services	

Q6: How has the level of risk of cyber incidents in the different sectors and subsectors covered by the NIS Directive evolved since the Directive entered into force in 2016?

	Very significant decrease in risk	Significant decrease in risk	No increase or decrease in risk	Significant increase in risk	Very significant increase in risk	Don't know / no opinion
Online marketplaces	0	0	0	0	•	©
Online search engines	0	0	0	0	•	0
Cloud computing services	0	0	0	0	•	0

## Q7: How do you evaluate the level of cybersecurity resilience when it comes to the different types of digital service providers covered by the NIS Directive?

	Very low	Low	Medium	High	Very high	Don't know / no opinion
Online marketplaces	0	0	•	0	0	0
Online search engines	0	0	•	0	0	•
Cloud computing services	0	0	•	0	0	•

## Sub-section 2.e. – Security requirements

Member States are required to ensure that entities take appropriate and proportionate technical and organisational measures to manage the risks posed to the security of network and information systems.

Q1: What is the impact of imposing security requirements on OES by the NIS Directive in terms of cyber resilience?

- No impact
- Low impact
- Medium impact
- High impact
- Don't know / no opinion

## Please elaborate your answer:

1	000 character(s) maximum

Q2: What is the impact of imposing security requirements on DSPs by the NIS Directive in terms of cyber resilience?

- No impact
- Low impact
- Medium impact
- High impact
- Don't know / no opinion

## Please elaborate your answer:

1	000	characi	ter(s) maxin	num				

Q3: To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding the implementation of security requirements under the NIS Directive?

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know / no opinion
Member States have established effective security requirements for OES on a national level.	0	•	0	•	0
There is a sufficient degree of alignment of security requirements for OES and DSPs in all MS.	•	•	0	•	0

1	000 character(s) maximum

Are there sectoral differences for OES regarding how effectively security requirements have been put in place by the Member States?

- Yes
- O No
- Don't know / no opinion

Q4: While some Member States have put in place rather general security requirements, other Member States have enacted very detailed requirements featuring a higher degree of prescriptiveness. To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding these different approaches?

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know / no opinion
Prescriptive requirements make it easy for companies to be compliant.	0	0	•	0	0
Prescriptive requirements leave too little flexibility to companies.	0	•	0	0	0
Prescriptive requirements ensure a higher level of cybersecurity than general risk management obligations.	©	•	•	•	0
Prescriptive requirements make it difficult to take into account technological progress,					

new approaches to doing cybersecurity and other developments.	0	•	0	0	0
The different level of prescriptiveness of requirements increases a regulatory burden for companies operating across different national markets.	•	•	0	•	•
The companies should have the possibility to use certification to demonstrate compliance with the NIS security requirements.	•	•	•	•	0
The companies should be required to use certification for their compliance with NIS security requirements.	0	0	0	•	0

#### Please elaborate your answers:

1000 character(s) maximum

The NIS Directive should leverage on the European certification schemes created in the framework of the Cybersecurity Act (CSA) to demonstrate the ability of OES and DSP to meet a high level of protection. Following a risk-based approach, certification of highly critical products must be done at a level "High" pursuant to the CSA.

Security certificate at level "High" ensures a continuous monitoring and maintenance of the certification scheme by a community of recognised experts from the industry. It is the only way to ensure "the state of the art" of security for critical infrastructures.

For some types of products, (e.g. secure hardware based), the future EU CC Scheme may be used. For other types of products, other certification schemes of level "High", such as the one proposed by the thematic group IACS Cybersecurity Certification Framework led by ERNCIP and launched by the European Commission, may be used.

#### Sub-section 2.f. – Incident notification

Member States are required to ensure that entities notify the competent authority or the CSIRT of incidents having a significant impact on the continuity or provision of services.

## Q1: To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding the implementation of notification requirements under the NIS Directive?

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know / no opinion
The majority of companies have developed a good understanding of what constitutes an incident that has to be reported under the NIS Directive.	0	0	0	0	•

Member States have imposed notification requirements obliging companies to report all significant incidents.	0	0	0	0	•
Different reporting thresholds and deadlines across the EU create unnecessary compliance burden for OES.	0	0	0	0	•
The current approach ensures that OES across the Union face sufficiently similar incident notification requirements.	0	•	0	•	•

### Please elaborate your answers:

1	000 character(s) maximum

## Sub-section 2.g. – Level of discretion on transposition and implementation given to Member States

The NIS Directive gives a wide room of discretion to Member States when it comes to the identification of operators of essential services, the setting of security requirements and the rules governing incident notification.

## Q1: To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding this approach from an internal market perspective?

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know / no opinion
The approach leads to significant differences in the application of the Directive and has a strong negative impact on the level playing field for companies in the internal market.	0	0	0	•	•
The approach increases costs for OES operating in more than one Member State.	0	0	0	•	0
The approach allows Member States to take into account national specificities.	0	0	0	0	•

## Please elaborate your answers:

1000 character(s) maximum

The revision of the NIS Directive should lead to the adoption of a NIS Regulation. The adoption of a regulation would foster harmonisation across the EU and hence resolve fragmentation issues, such as different sets of security requirements and diverging identification methods.

However, the functioning of the NIS cooperation group should be maintained. In addition, the decisions and technical documents of the NIS cooperation group should be translated into legally binding documents.

#### Sub-section 2.h. - Enforcement

The Directive requires Member States to assess the compliance of operators of essential services with the provisions of the Directive. They must also ensure that competent authorities act when operators of essential services or digital service providers do not meet the requirements laid down in the Directive. Member States must also lay down rules for penalties that are effective, proportionate and dissuasive.

# Q1: To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding national enforcement of the provisions of the NIS Directive and its respective national implementations?

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know / no opinion
Member States are effectively enforcing the compliance of OES.	0	0	0	0	•
Member States are effectively enforcing the compliance of DSPs.	0	0	0	0	•
The types and levels of penalties set by Member States are effective, proportionate and dissuasive.	0	0	0	0	•
There is a sufficient degree of alignment of penalty levels between the different Member States.	0	0	0	0	•

## Sub-section 2.i. – Information exchange

The NIS Directive has created two new fora for information exchange: the Cooperation Group to support and facilitate strategic cooperation and the exchange of information among Member States, and the CSIRTs network, which promotes swift and effective operational cooperation between national CSIRTs.

## Q1: To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding the functioning of the Cooperation Group and the CSIRTs network?

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know / no opinion
The Cooperation Group has been of significant help for the Member States to implement the NIS Directive.	0	0	•	0	0

The Cooperation Group has played an important role in aligning national transposition measures.	0	0	•	0	0
The Cooperation Group has been instrumental in dealing with general cybersecurity matters.	0	0	0	•	0
The Cooperation Group is dealing with cross- border dependencies in an effective manner.	0	0	•	0	0
The CSIRTs network has effectively managed to fulfil its tasks as laid down in the NIS Directive.	0	0	•	0	0
The CSIRTs network has helped to build confidence and trust amongst its members.	0	0	0	•	0
The CSIRTs network has achieved swift and effective operational cooperation.	0	0	•	0	0
The Cooperation Group and the CSIRTs network cooperate effectively.	0	0	0	0	•

Q2: Should the Cooperation Group be assigned additional tasks so far not listed in the NIS Directive?

- Yes
- O No
- Don't know / no opinion

Q3: Should the CSIRTs network be assigned additional tasks so far not listed in the NIS Directive?

- Yes
- O No
- Don't know / no opinion

Sub-section 2.j. - Efficiency of the NIS Directive

Q1: To what extent have the effects of the NIS Directive been achieved at a reasonable cost? To what extent are the costs of the intervention justified and proportionate given the benefits it has achieved?

- Not at all
- To a little extent
- To some extent
- To a large extent

Don't know / no opinion

#### Please elaborate your answer:

1000 character(s) maximum

The NIS Directive has been instrumental in increasing the cyber-resilience of the EU. OES and DSP are key for the functioning of our society and the NIS Directive enabled to reach a minimum level of cyber-resilience in these sectors. Given the tragic -potentially cross-border- impact that a disruption of these services would cause, the intervention is fully justified and proportionate. The costs incurred by companies in case of cyber-attacks could be much higher than the measures that must be implemented.

However, as stated earlier, some improvements, including better harmonisation of identification processes and security requirements, are needed to make the legislation fully effective.

Q2: What impact has the NIS Directive had on the overall level of resilience against cyber-threats across the EU when it comes to entities providing services that are essential for the maintenance of critical societal and economic activities?

- No impact
- Low impact
- Medium impact
- High impact
- Don't know / no opinion

### Please elaborate your answer:

1000 character(s) maximum

The impact has been very strong for companies identified by national authorities as OES. However, many entities providing services that are essential for the maintenance of critical societal and economic activities still fall outside the scope of the NIS Directive.

In addition, mandatory cybersecurity certification would increase this impact by ensuring that OES and DSP adequately implement the security requirements.

#### Sub-section 2.k. - Coherence of the NIS Directive with other EU legal instruments

The NIS Directive is not the only legal instrument on EU level that seeks to ensure more security of our digital environment. EU laws such as the General Data Protection Regulation or the European Electronic Communications Code are pursuing similar objectives.

Q1: To what extent are the provisions of the NIS Directive (such as on security requirements and incident notification) coherent with the provisions of other EU legal instruments that are aimed at increasing the level of data protection or the level of resilience?

12345

#### Please elaborate your answer:

Don't know / no opinion

1000 character(s) maximum

Coherence between the eIDAS Regulation and the NIS Directive could be improved. The eIDAS Regulation is complementary legislation to the NIS Directive. OES should rely on qualified trust services and electronic identification (with a level of assurance High) in the meaning of the eIDAS Regulation. The NIS Directive could better reference these tools in its primary or secondary legislation.

Coherence with the Medical Devices Regulation and PSD2 could also be improved. Both legislations establish a sectorial obligation of incident reporting. This overlaps with a similar obligation stemming from the NIS Directive. There is a need for a harmonised reporting mechanism.

## Section 3: Approaches to cybersecurity in the European context currently not addressed by the NIS Directive

### Sub-section 3.a. – Provision of cybersecurity information

Pursuant to the provisions of NIS Directive, Member States have to require operators of essential services and digital service providers to report incidents above certain thresholds. However, organisations collect a lot of valuable information about cybersecurity risks that do not materialise into reportable incidents.

## Q1: How could organisations be incentivised to share more information with cybersecurity authorities on a voluntary basis?

1000 character(s) maximum

Organisations could be incentivised to share more information with cybersecurity authorities if the EU-wide Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (ISAC) is given more importance and resources. ENISA could help.

Q2: Under the NIS Directive, Member States shall require companies to report events having an actual adverse effect on the security of network and information systems (incidents). Should the reporting obligations be broadened to include other types of information in order to improve the situational awareness of competent authorities?

Yes

No

Don't know / no opinion

Q3: The previous two questions have explored ways of improving the information available to cybersecurity authorities on national level. Which information gathered by such authorities should be made available on European level to improve common situational awareness (such as incidents with cross-border relevance, statistical data that could be aggregated by a European body etc.)?

1000 character(s) maximum

Information on issues that might have cross-border impacts should be shared at EU level. A specific attention should be paid to vulnerability disclosure. However, sensitive information should not be made publicly available (for example attack methods to test the product).

#### Sub-section 3.b. -Information exchange between companies

Some Member States have fostered the development of fora where companies can exchange information about cybersecurity. This includes inter alia public private partnerships (PPP) or sectorial Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISACs). To some extent, such fora also exist on European and international level.

## Q1: How would you evaluate the level of information exchange between organisations in their respective sectors when it comes to cybersecurity?

	Very low level	Low	Medium level	High level	Very high level	Don't know / no opinion
Electricity	0	0	0	0	0	•
Oil	0	0	0	0	0	•
Gas	0	0	0	0	0	•
Air transport	0	0	0	0	0	•
Rail transport	0	0	0	0	0	•
Water transport	0	0	0	0	0	•
Road transport	0	0	0	0	0	•
Banking	0	0	0	0	0	•
Financial market infrastructures	0	0	0	0	0	•
Health sector	0	0	0	0	0	•
Drinking water supply and distribution	0	0	0	0	0	•

Digital infrastructure (IXPs, DNS providers, TLD registries)	0	0	0	0	0	•
Digital service providers (online marketplaces)	0	0	0	0	0	•
Digital service providers (online search engines)	0	0	0	0	0	•
Digital service providers (cloud computing services)	0	0	0	0	0	•

Q2: How would you evaluate the level of information exchange between organisations across sectors when it comes to cybersecurity?

- Very low level
- Low level
- Medium level
- High level
- Very high level
- Don't know / no opinion

Q3: How could the level of information exchange between companies be improved within Member States but also across the European Union?

1000 character(s) maximum

The EU-wide ISAC including companies from all sectors and national authorities should be given more resources and extended to organisations which are not necessarily covered by the NIS Directive (e.g. smart cities etc.).

### Sub-section 3.c. - Vulnerability discovery and coordinated vulnerability disclosure

While the negative impact of vulnerabilities present in ICT products and services is constantly increasing, finding and remedying such vulnerabilities plays an important role in reducing the overall cybersecurity risk. Cooperation between organisations, manufacturers or providers of ICT products and services, and members of the cybersecurity research community and governments who find vulnerabilities has been proven to significantly increase both the rate of discovery and the remedy of vulnerabilities. Coordinated vulnerability disclosure specifies a structured process of cooperation in which vulnerabilities are reported to the owner of the information system, allowing the organisation the opportunity to diagnose and remedy the vulnerability before detailed vulnerability information is disclosed to third parties or to the public. The process also provides for coordination between the finder and the organisation as regards the publication of those vulnerabilities.

Some Member States have put in place coordinated vulnerability disclosure policies that further facilitate the cooperation of all involved stakeholders.

Q1: How do you evaluate the level of effectiveness of such national policies in making vulnerability information available in a more timely manner?  Very low level  Low level  Medium level  High level  Very high level  Don't know / no opinion
Q2: Have you implemented a coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy?  Yes  No  Don't know / no opinion  Not applicable
Q3: How would you describe your experience with vulnerability disclosure in the EU and how would you improve it?  1000 character(s) maximum
Q4: Should national authorities such as CSIRTs take proactive measures to discover vulnerabilities in ICT products and services provided by private companies?  1000 character(s) maximum
Mandatory certification at level high (pursuant to the Cybersecurity Act) includes penetration testing, which is a way to find vulnerabilities. National cybersecurity authorities are involved in the certification process at level High. Private organisations play a crucial role in the maintenance of certification schemes.
Sub-section 3.d. – Security of connected products  The constantly growing proliferation of connected products creates enormous opportunities for businesses and citizens but it is not without its challenges: a security incident affecting one ICT product can affect the whole system leading to severe impacts in terms of disruption to economic and social activities.
Q1: Do you believe that there is a need of having common EU cybersecurity rules for connected products placed on the internal market?    Yes

#### Don't know / no opinion

#### If yes, please elaborate your answer

1000 character(s) maximum

There is a strong need for minimum security requirements for connected products placed on the internal market. Such requirements should be based on the ETSI EN 303 645 standard ("Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things: Baseline Requirements"). These future mandatory requirements (future delegated act of the Radio Equipment Directive) are a first step and should be complemented by requirements for services and backend systems.

In this respect the CSA can be a useful tool. Certification of connected products at level substantial would considerably improve the cyber-resilience of such connected products. Eurosmart has developed prototypes for CSA evaluation methodology for IoT products.

## Sub-section 3.e. – Measures to support small and medium-sized enterprises and raise awareness

A few Member States have taken measures to raise the levels of awareness and understanding of cyber risk amongst small and medium-sized enterprises. Some Member States are also supporting such companies in dealing with cyber risk (for example by disseminating warnings and alerts or by offering training and financial support).

## Q1: To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding such measures?

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Don't know / no opinion
Such measures have proven to be effective in increasing the level of awareness and protection amongst SMEs.	0	•	0	0	•
European legislation should require Member States to put in place frameworks to raise awareness amongst SMEs and support them.	0	•	0	•	•

## Closing section: Submit your responses (and possibility to upload a document)

Thank you for your contribution to this questionnaire. In case you want to share further ideas on these topics, you can upload a document below.

### Please upload your file

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#### **Contact**

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