

**U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council Inaugural
Joint Statement
September 29, 2021
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania**

Section 1. Pittsburgh Statement

1. The U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) met for the first time in Pittsburgh on 29 September 2021. It was co-chaired by Executive Vice President Valdis Dombrovskis, Executive Vice President Margrethe Vestager, Secretary Antony Blinken, Secretary Gina Raimondo, and U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai. The EU and the U.S. reaffirm the TTC's objective to: coordinate approaches to key global technology, economic, and trade issues; and to deepen transatlantic trade and economic relations, basing policies in shared democratic values.
2. We support the continued growth of the U.S.-EU technology, economic and trade relationship and cooperation in addressing global challenges. We intend to collaborate to promote shared economic growth that benefits workers on both sides of the Atlantic, expand and deepen transatlantic trade and investments, fight the climate crisis, protect the environment, promote workers' rights, expand resilient and sustainable supply chains, and expand cooperation on critical and emerging technologies. We stand together in continuing to protect our businesses and workers from unfair trade practices, in particular those posed by non-market economies that are undermining the world trading system.
3. We share a strong desire to drive the digital transformation that spurs trade and investment, benefits workers, protects the environment and climate, strengthens our technological and industrial leadership, sets high standards globally, boosts innovation, and protects and promotes critical and emerging technologies and infrastructure. We intend to cooperate on the development and deployment of new technologies in ways that reinforce our shared democratic values, including respect for universal human rights, our respective efforts to address the climate change crisis, and that encourage compatible standards and regulations.
4. The cooperation and exchanges of the TTC are without prejudice to the regulatory autonomy of the United States and the European Union and will respect the different legal systems in both jurisdictions. Cooperation within the TTC will also feed into coordination in multilateral bodies and wider efforts with like-minded partners, with the aim of promoting democratic models of digital governance.
5. To strengthen our cooperation, we make the following decisions on areas of joint work over the next [[timeframe]], with the intent of achieving concrete outcomes on these issues by the time of our next meeting in the first quarter of 2022.

Section 2. Pittsburgh outcomes

6. As a demonstration of our shared commitment to make progress on the objectives of the TTC, the EU and the US have agreed outcomes on the following specific areas, the details of which are reflected in four specific papers at Annex.
 - i. We believe that our openness to foreign investment is essential for economic growth and innovation. We intend to maintain **investment screening** regimes in order exclusively to address risks for national security and, within the EU, public

- order. We recognize that our investment screening regimes should be accompanied by the appropriate enforcement mechanisms. Furthermore, investment screening regimes should be guided by the principles set forth in the 2009 OECD Guidelines. We also intend to engage with other partner countries and stakeholders on investment screening.
- ii. We recognize the importance of effective controls on trade in dual-use items. Such **export controls** are necessary to ensure compliance with our international obligations and commitments. We affirm that a multilateral approach to export controls is most effective for protecting international security and supporting a global level-playing field. We note that the potential applications of emerging technologies in the defence and security field raise important concerns, and recognize the need to address these risks. We have determined shared principles and areas for export control cooperation, including, where appropriate, prior consultations concerning the introduction of controls outside the multilateral regimes.
 - iii. The EU and the US believe that **artificial intelligence technologies** have the potential to bring significant benefits to our citizens, societies and economies. AI technologies can help tackle many significant challenges that we face and can improve the quality of our lives. The EU and the US acknowledge that AI technologies also have risks associated with it if it is not developed, deployed and used responsibly in ways consistent with human rights and our shared values, or if they are misused. The EU and the US affirm their willingness and intention to develop and implement trustworthy and responsible AI and their commitment to a human-centred approach.
 - iv. The EU and the US reaffirm our commitment to building an partnership on the rebalancing of global supply chains in **semiconductors** with a view to enhancing respective security of supply as well as capacity to design and produce the most powerful and resource-efficient semiconductors. These are the purpose of the CHIPS Act for America and the planned European Chips Act. This partnership must be balanced and of equal interest for both parties. [We underline the importance of jointly identifying gaps in the semiconductor value chain, and strengthening our domestic semiconductor ecosystems.]
 - v. With respect to **global trade challenges**, we intend to work closely together to deal with particularly injurious non-market trade distortive policies and practices, improve the effectiveness of our respective domestic measures and explore ways to combat the negative effects of such practices in third countries. We also intend to work together to create competitive, free, and fair Transatlantic commerce in new and emerging technologies, by actively anticipating and avoiding potential unnecessary **non-tariff barriers**, while always respecting each side's regulatory autonomy.
 - vi. We aim to protect **workers and labor rights**, to sharpen our tools, and to fight forced and child labor. We will also look at how to address relevant **trade and environment** issues.
7. We acknowledge and welcome the importance of consulting closely with diverse **stakeholders** as we undertake our work. We share a strong desire to engage closely with stakeholders on both sides of the Atlantic as we pursue our agendas through the TTC. Robust engagement with business, thought leaders, labor organizations, environmental constituencies, academics, and other stakeholders that form the civil society at large will be essential as we progress with this work. We will make available

points of contact, where stakeholders may submit their inputs, comments and views. Moreover, regular exchanges with the stakeholders will be organized through diverse channels, both at the level of working groups and political principals, as well as by each of the respective parties or jointly. This is to encourage the transatlantic stakeholder community to provide common proposals on the work pursued by the TTC.

Section 3. Future scope of work

8. We ask that each of the **working groups** established under the TTC carry forward important work to strengthen our relationship and cooperation. Specifically, we ask that the working groups, by our next meeting, focus on the following:

- **Working Group 1 - Technology Standards:** The Technology Standards working group is tasked to develop approaches for coordination and cooperation in critical and emerging technology standards including AI and internet of things, and other emerging technologies. To foster AI that reinforces shared democratic values, we will consider a risk-based approach to AI and discuss measurement and evaluation tools and other activities to further the assessment and development of trustworthy AI and the implementation of AI principles. The United States and European Union recognize the importance of international standardisation activities at the International Organization for Standardization, the International Electrotechnical Commission, the International Telecommunications Union, and other international standards-developing organisations. The EU and the U.S. aim at identifying opportunities for collaborative proactive action and to defend our common interests and democratic values in international standards activities for critical and emerging technologies. As such, we plan to develop both formal and informal cooperation mechanisms to share information regarding technical proposals in specified technology areas and seek opportunities to coordinate on international standards activities.
- **Working Group 2 - Climate and Clean Tech: Given the great importance of technology to address environmental challenges and connected market opportunities,** the Climate and Clean Tech working group is tasked to identify opportunities to support transatlantic trade and investment in low- and zero- carbon technologies, products and services, including collaboration in third countries, research and innovation and to engage in dialogue on the policies and framework conditions needed to promote wide deployment of these technologies and to jointly explore the methodologies, tools, and technologies for calculating embedded GHG emissions in global trade including methodologies for calculating the net environmental impact of digitally enabled solutions
- **Working Group 3 - Secure Supply Chains: Alongside the dedicated track on semiconductors,** the Secure Supply Chains working group is tasked to focus on advancing supply chain resilience and security of supply in key sectors for the green and digital transition and for securing the protection of our citizens. A first focus will be on clean energy, pharmaceuticals, and critical materials. In connection with these sectors, the working group is tasked to seek to: increase transparency of supply and demand; map respective existing sectoral capabilities; exchange on investment incentives and research and development priorities; and identify and coordinate strategies to promote supply chain resilience and diversification.
- **Working Group 4 - Information Communication Technology and Services**

(ICTS) Security and Competitiveness: The working group is tasked to continue to work towards ensuring security and resilience in key areas of the entire ICT supply chain, including sensitive areas such as 5G, undersea cables, data centers cloud infrastructure, and microelectronics components. The working group will explore concrete cooperation on development finance for secure and resilient digital connectivity in third countries. The working group will seek to reinforce cooperation on research and innovation for beyond 5G and 6G systems. The U.S and EU governments could develop a common vision and roadmap for preparing the next generation of communication technologies towards 6G.

- **Working Group 5 - Data Governance and Technology Platforms:** The Data Governance and Technology Platforms working group is tasked to exchange information on our respective approaches to technology platform governance, seeking convergence where feasible. We have identified common issues of concern around gatekeeper power by major platforms and the responsibility of online intermediaries. This includes in particular the responsibility of online intermediaries to safeguard democratic processes from the impact of their business activities. Areas of common ground, shared concerns, and similar approaches include content moderation and fair competition, where we follow similar objectives. We commit to transatlantic cooperation as regards platform policies that will focus, at a first step, on information exchange on areas of cooperation with industry, such as the EU Code of Conduct on countering illegal hate speech and Code of Practice on disinformation, and the Product Safety Pledge and to working on new and emerging areas, including algorithmic amplification, transparency in content moderation and data access for researchers. We plan to engage with platform companies to improve researchers' access to data generated by platforms, in order to ultimately better understand systemic risks linked to how content spreads online. We also plan to engage in a discussion on effective regulatory means to tackle economic power of largest online platforms and ensuring effective competition and contestable markets.
- **Working Group 6 - Misuse of Technology Threatening Security and Human Rights:** The Misuse of Technology to Threaten Security and Human Rights working group will expand upon a few concrete topics that will aim at joining forces to avoid abuse of technology against security and human rights including arbitrary or unlawful surveillance, including on social media platforms, and its impact on human rights; building an effective mechanism, in conjunction with the G7 and others to respond to Internet shutdowns; protecting human rights defenders online; combatting disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference with democratic processes, while upholding freedom of expression by increasing bilateral cooperation.
- **Working Group 7 - Export Controls:** The Export Controls working group will engage in technical consultations on legislative and regulatory developments, will exchange information on risk assessments and licensing good practices, as well as on compliance and enforcement approaches, promote convergent control approaches on sensitive dual-use technologies, and perform joint industry outreach on dual-use export controls.
- **Working Group 8 - Investment Screening:** The Investment Screening working group intends to focus on exchanging information on investment trends impacting security, including strategic trends with respect to industries concerned, origin of investments, and types of transactions; on best practices, including with respect to risk analysis and the systems for risk mitigation measures with a focus on sensitive technologies and related sensitive data, including personal data; and together with

other groups, including Export Controls: develop a holistic view of the policy tools addressing risks related to specific sensitive technologies. This year the working group will conduct a joint EU/US virtual outreach event for stakeholders.

- **Working Group 9 - Promoting Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises (SME) Access to and Use of Digital Tools:** This working group is tasked to launch outreach and communication activities that will offer opportunities for SMEs to share their needs, experience, strategies and best practices with broader U.S. and EU SME communities and policymakers ensuring a better understanding of the barriers to their digital empowerment. Additionally, through listening sessions with SME and underserved communities and resulting analysis and reporting, develop recommendations and policy guidelines for U.S. and EU policymakers to implement that will accelerate access to and the uptake of digital technologies.
- **Working Group 10 - Global Trade Challenges:** In accordance with the attached statement on global trade challenges, Working Group 10 will focus on challenges from non-market economies, non-tariff barriers in products and services of emerging technology, fundamental labour rights and decent work, and trade and environment issues complementing other TTC work streams.

Statement on Investment Screening

- The United States and the European Union believe that openness to foreign investment is essential for economic growth and innovation. They take note of the very significant volume of investments, exceeding four trillion euros / dollars linking companies on both sides of the Atlantic, which illustrates the strength of the transatlantic partnership.
- The U.S. and the EU intend to continue to protect themselves from risk arising from certain foreign investment through investment screening exclusively focused on addressing risks for national security and, within the EU, public order as well.
- The U.S. and the EU recognize that investment screening regimes should be based on legislative or regulatory frameworks accompanied by the appropriate enforcement mechanisms.
- Furthermore, drawing on best practices, investment screening regimes should be guided by the principles of non-discrimination, transparency and predictability, proportionality of measures to address risks, and accountability of implementing authorities, as set forth in the *Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment Policies Relating to National Security, adopted by the OECD Council in May 2009*¹
- The U.S. and the EU envisage to meet periodically, through the TTC Investment Screening Working Group and other appropriate channels, to exchange information on investment trends and best practices related to effective investment screening implemented in line with the above principles, while respecting confidentiality limitations. In particular, the US and the EU intend to explore the following work-streams:
 - exchanges on investment trends impacting security, including strategic trends with respect to industries concerned, origin of investments, and types of transactions;
 - exchanges on best practices, i.a. risk analysis and the systems for risk mitigation measures, with a focus on sensitive technologies, issues related to access to sensitive data, including personal data;
 - holistic view of the policy tools addressing risks related to specific sensitive technologies;
- The U.S. and the EU also envisage to maintain lines of communication with stakeholders on these issues and engage with other partners globally on investment screening.
- This year the working group will conduct a joint EU/US virtual outreach event for stakeholders.

¹ <https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/43384486.pdf>

Statement on Export Control Cooperation

Principles

1. The EU and the US recognise the importance of effective controls on trade in dual-use items, including transfers in sensitive technologies. Such controls are necessary to ensure compliance with our international obligations and commitments, in particular regarding non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional peace, security, stability and respect for human rights and international humanitarian law.
2. The EU and the US underline that a multilateral approach to export controls is most effective for protecting international security and supporting a global level-playing field. They reiterate their commitment to working with partners and allies to coordinate and broaden the global response, promoting a multilateral rules-based trade and security system founded on transparency, reciprocity, and fairness.
3. The EU and the US note that the potential applications of emerging technologies in the defence and security field raise important legal, ethical, and political concerns and recognize the need to address risks associated with the trade in emerging technologies.
4. The EU and the US share concerns that technology acquisition strategies, including economic coercive measures, and civil-military fusion policies of certain actors challenge the objective assessment of risks by the competent authorities and the effective implementation of rules-based controls in line with internationally-agreed standards.
5. The EU and the US are of the view that export controls should not unduly disrupt strategic supply chains nor undermine the rules-based multilateral trading system, and should be conducted in compliance with WTO rules. The EU and the US recognize the value of coordinated approaches and intend to hold, where appropriate, prior consultations concerning the introduction of controls outside the multilateral regimes, in particular to ensure that the application of export controls is transparent and fair for EU and US exporters.
6. The EU and the US acknowledge the need for controls on trade in certain dual-use items, in particular certain cyber-surveillance technologies, in order to prevent their misuse in ways which might lead to serious violations of human rights or international humanitarian law.
7. The EU and the US also recognise the responsibility of the private sector, as well as public R&D institutions, under export control rules as well as the importance of raising awareness in the private and the research sectors, and that promoting cooperation and self-regulation is integral to effective export controls. They are committed to working closely in partnership with the private sector and public R&D institutions in that regard.
8. Against this backdrop the Export Control Working Group under the Trade and Technology Council, building on the on-going EU-US Export Control Dialogue, enables the EU and US to enhance cooperation on export controls. It provides a dedicated forum to address evolving security risks and challenges associated with trade in strategic dual-use technologies.

Cooperation areas

The EU and the US intend to enhance their cooperation in the following areas:

- **Technical consultations on current and upcoming legislative and regulatory developments** to promote the global convergence of controls and ensure legal security

for EU and US companies, including regular adjustments to control lists and specific licence exceptions/General Export Authorisations, development of guidelines, as well as relevant regulatory developments in third countries;

- **Technical consultations and development of convergent control approaches on sensitive dual-use technologies**, including certain dual-use emerging technologies, and with respect to trade in cyber-surveillance technologies and their human rights implications;
- **Information exchange on risks associated with:**
 - the export of sensitive technologies to destinations and entities of concern, exchange of good practice on the implementation and licensing for listed or non-listed sensitive items;
 - technology transfers and dual-use research of concern and exchange of best practices to support the effective application of controls while facilitating research collaboration between EU and US research organisations;
- **Technical consultations on compliance and enforcement approaches** (i.e. legal and regulatory basis, institutional and administrative arrangements) and actions;
- **Technical consultations regarding multilateral and international cooperation**, including prior to the introduction of controls outside the multilateral regimes, as appropriate.

Next Steps

[Placeholder for next steps in the weeks after 29 September, such as meetings, joint outreach to industry stakeholders etc., to ensure delivery of the above principles and cooperation areas]

Statement on Artificial Intelligence

- The EU and the US believe that artificial intelligence technologies (AI) have the potential to bring significant benefits to our citizens, societies and economies. AI technologies can help tackle many significant challenges that we face and they can improve the quality of our lives.
- The EU and the US acknowledge that AI technologies also have risks associated with them if they are not developed, deployed and used in accordance with human rights and our shared values.
- The EU and the US affirm their willingness and intention to develop and implement trustworthy AI and their commitment to a human-centred approach, which they have already demonstrated by endorsing the OECD Recommendation on AI. Moreover, the EU and the US are founding members of the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence, which brings together a coalition of like-minded partners seeking to support and guide the responsible development of AI that is grounded in human rights, inclusion, diversity, innovation, economic growth and societal benefit.
- The EU and the US are committed to working together to ensure that AI technologies serve our societies and economies and that they are used in ways consistent with our common democratic values and human rights. Accordingly, the EU and the US are opposed to uses of AI technologies that do not respect international human rights law, such as rights-violating systems of social scoring.
- The US notes with interest the European Commission's proposal for a risk-based regulatory framework for AI. The framework defines high-risk uses of AI, which are to be subject to a number of requirements. The EU also supports a number of research, innovation and testing projects on trustworthy AI as part of its AI strategy.
- The EU notes with interest the United States government's development of an AI Risk Management Framework, as well as ongoing projects on trustworthy AI as part of the U.S. National AI Initiative.
- The EU and the US **agree on a risk-based approach to AI**, which allows society to reap the benefits of AI while ensuring the necessary level of protection. Policy and regulatory measures should therefore be based on, and proportionate to, the risks posed by different uses of AI.
- We intend to work together to foster responsible stewardship of trustworthy AI that reflects our shared values and commitment to protecting the rights and dignity of all our citizens. We seek to provide scalable, research-based methods to advance trustworthy approaches to AI that serve all people in responsible, equitable, and beneficial ways.

Areas of cooperation

The EU and the US want to translate our common values into tangible action and cooperation for mutual benefit.

1. The EU and the US are committed to the responsible stewardship of trustworthy AI and will continue to uphold and implement the OECD Recommendation. We will discuss and aim at convergence on **principles** that underlie our cooperation and will exchange on a mutual understanding of their implementation.

2. The EU and the US agree to discuss **measurement and evaluation tools** and activities to assess the technical requirements for trustworthy AI, concerning, for example, accuracy and bias mitigation
3. The EU and the United States commit to collaborate on projects furthering the development of trustworthy AI – in full compliance with our respective rules – to explore better use of machine learning and other AI techniques towards desirable impacts. Areas of cooperation will be defined through dedicated exchanges.

Statement on Semiconductor Supply Chains

- The EU and the US reaffirm their willingness to building an EU-US partnership on the rebalancing of global supply chains in semiconductors with a view to enhancing EU and US respective security of supply as well as capacity to design and produce the most powerful and resource efficient semiconductors. These are the purpose of the CHIPS act for America and the planned European Chips Act. This partnership must be balanced and of equal interest for both parties.
- We acknowledge that semiconductors are the material basis for integrated circuits that are essential to modern day life and underpin our economies. As such, semiconductors power virtually every sector of the economy, including energy, healthcare, agriculture, consumer electronics, manufacturing, defence, and transportation. They determine the characteristics of the products into which they are embedded, including security, computing power, privacy, energy performance and safety.
- We recognize that the semiconductor supply chain, from raw materials, design and manufacturing to assembly, testing and incorporation into end products, is extremely complex and geographically dispersed. The development and production of semiconductors include multiple countries, with some very concentrated segments. The EU and US have some important respective strengths, leading to significant mutual dependencies, as well important common external dependencies.
- The COVID-19 pandemic has further increased the importance of semiconductors. They have enabled remote health care, medical research, working and studying from home and electronic commerce. Through the pandemic, shortages of certain semiconductors have highlighted the importance of ensuring stable, resilient and robust supply chains for these vital products.
- We agree that promoting investment, transparency, and collaboration, in partnership with industry and all relevant stakeholders, is essential to address the semiconductor shortage.
- We underline the importance of jointly identifying gaps in the semiconductors value chain, and strengthening our domestic semiconductor ecosystems, from, research, design to manufacturing, with a view to improving resilience, through consultation with stakeholders, and the right incentives.
- We share the aim of avoiding a subsidy race and the risk of crowding out private investments that would themselves contribute to our security and resilience.
- We recognize the need to reduce existing strategic dependencies throughout the supply chain, especially through a diversification of the supply chain and increased investment. Without prejudice to cooperation with other likeminded partners, we shall focus on addressing common external dependencies, while enhancing our respective security of supply.
- We recognize the importance of protecting ourselves from risk arising from certain foreign investments in semiconductors through investment screening.
- Where export controls for semiconductors are necessary, we agree on the importance of designing and implementing them in a coordinated manner, considering to the extent possible the impact on each other's industries and research organizations, as well as foreign policy objectives.
- We will work jointly so that any investment made on our territories is done in full respect of our respective security of supply.

Statement on Global Trade Challenges

The United States and the European Union (EU) will initially focus on the following specific objectives in the Global Trade Challenges Working Group.

Trade Policy Cooperation towards Non-Market Economies (NMEs)

In paragraph 22 of the Joint Statement issued following their June 15, 2021 summit meeting, President Biden, President Michel, and President von der Leyen stated:

“We intend to work cooperatively on efforts to achieve meaningful World Trade Organization (WTO) reform and help promote outcomes that benefit our workers and companies.....We intend to seek to update the WTO rulebook with more effective disciplines on industrial subsidies, unfair behavior of state-owned enterprises, and other trade and market distorting practices.”

As a complement to this cooperation, the United States and the EU will focus in the Global Trade Challenges Working Group on responding to the challenges posed by non-market economies cited in the June 15 Joint Statement.

The United States and the EU, as democratic market economies, share a number of core values, including with respect to human and labor rights, environmental protection, the rule of law, non-discrimination, regulatory transparency, market-based commerce, and the freedom to innovate and to have innovations protected.

We intend to work together in the Global Trade Challenges Working Group to ensure that our trade policies support these and other shared values, including by promoting them internationally and by resisting challenges to these values in global commerce arising from non-market distortive policies and practices.

Among the actions the United States and the EU will take in the Global Trade Challenges Working Group with respect to this objective are the following:

- 1) Share information on non-market distortive policies and practices that pose particular challenges for U.S. and EU workers and businesses, both across sectors and in relation to specific sectors in which we have identified certain risks, with the goal of developing strategies for mitigating or responding to those policies, practices, and challenges. Non-market practices that raise concerns include – but are not limited to – forced technology transfer; state-sponsored theft of intellectual property; market-distorting industrial subsidies, including support given to and through SOEs, and all other types of support offered by governments; the establishment of domestic and international market share targets; discriminatory treatment of foreign companies and their products and services in support of industrial policy objectives; and anti-competitive and non-market actions of SOEs.

- 2) The United States and the EU recognize that domestic measures that each takes on its own can play a critical role in ensuring that trade policy supports market-based economies and the rule of law. This recognition is without prejudice to the views that either of them may have with respect to the appropriateness of any particular measure.

To improve the use and effectiveness of such domestic measures, the United States and the EU intend to:

- make an inventory of the growing number of domestic measures that the United States and the EU each already employ, and exchange information on the operation and effectiveness of those measures and on any plans for future measures; and,
 - to the extent practicable or deemed desirable by both the United States and the EU, consult or coordinate on the use and development of such domestic measures, with a view to increasing their effectiveness and mitigating collateral consequences for either the United States or the EU from any such measure developed.
- 3) Exchange information on the impact of non-market, distortive policies and practices in third countries and explore ways of working together and with other partners with a view to addressing the negative effects of such policies and practices, which can undermine development goals and have a negative impact on U.S. and EU commerce in those countries.

Avoiding Unnecessary Barriers to Trade

The United States and the EU recognize and respect the importance of regulation of goods and services to achieve legitimate policy objectives. They are also aware that such regulations may have unintended consequences and result in barriers to trade between them and that such barriers, once implemented, can be challenging to remove.

Consequently, the United States and the EU intend to work to anticipate and identify potential unnecessary barriers to transatlantic trade in products or services derived from new and emerging technologies, and to take steps to avoid them before they emerge, while ensuring that legitimate regulatory objectives are achieved.

This work will fully respect each side's regulatory autonomy and regulatory system, and will promote the highest level of openness and transparency and welcome input from all interested stakeholders.

Cooperation on Trade and Labor

The United States and the EU will promote together and in an inclusive way the protection of internationally recognized labor rights, including by combatting the scourge of forced and child labor, with each side using relevant trade policies and tools, including FTAs and unilateral arrangements, such as preference and other programs, and cooperating in the ILO, WTO, and other appropriate multilateral fora. Both sides will promote responsible business conduct, with the aim of enhancing the sustainability of global value chains. In pursuit of these objectives, we will:

- 1) Share information and best practices on trade measures related to the respect for labor rights and prevention of forced and child labor, including implementation and enforcement; new initiatives of each side, with a view to developing additional and joint ways to prevent forced labor; and the effectiveness of labor enforcement tools, with a view to improving them.
- 2) Cooperate and jointly support work in multilateral fora to promote labor rights, including to combat child and forced labor, and including in the WTO fisheries subsidies negotiations.
- 3) Discuss the impact of technology on labor markets, working conditions, and worker rights, including policy issues related to the “gig” economy, worker surveillance, and labor conditions throughout supply chains.
- 4) Exchange information on the implementation of labor provisions in our respective trade agreements.

Cooperation on Trade-Related Environmental and Climate Policies and Measures

The United States and the EU underline the positive role that trade can play in addressing environmental challenges such as climate change, achieving net-zero emissions, and supporting the transition to a more circular economy. The United States and the EU will consult on the inclusion in the work plan of the Global Trade Challenges Working Group trade and environment issues that may complement other TTC work streams.

Consultation with Stakeholders

The United States and the EU welcome input from and dialogue with business, trade unions, consumer organizations, and environmental and other non-government organizations on our work to respond to Global Trade Challenges, including joint input from transatlantic groupings of stakeholders. At least once a year, the Working Group will hold a meeting open to the participation of stakeholders to discuss its work and the proposals presented by stakeholders.